“The buyer needs a hundred eyes, the seller not one.” (George Herbert)

A Marina Da Gama property. A collapsed wooden deck. A purchase price of R1.55 million and repair costs claimed of just over R100 000. The facts are not complicated. But the legal battle that followed lasted more than a decade.

What happened

The buyers purchased a residential property in October 2013 after the estate agent described it as being in stunning condition. They took occupation in January 2014. Seven months later, the upper wooden deck collapsed. Expert evidence subsequently confirmed that the decks had been constructed without approved plans and were not built to National Building Regulations standards. The defects were latent, meaning they were not visible to a layperson on inspection.

The buyers pursued the estate agent, his close corporation, and the seller across eight separate claims. At the close of the buyers’ case, the defendants asked the court to dismiss the matter on the basis that insufficient evidence had been presented against them. The court agreed and dismissed all the claims.

“Stunning” is not a structural warranty

The buyers argued that the estate agent’s description of the property as being in “stunning” or “beautiful” condition amounted to an actionable misrepresentation. The court disagreed.

Descriptive sales language of that kind is puffery. It reflects aesthetic opinion, not structural fact. It does not amount to a representation about the integrity of the building, compliance with approved plans, or the absence of latent defects. To cross from puffery into misrepresentation, a statement must assert a verifiable fact. Words like “stunning” do not do that.

The estate agent’s duty of disclosure, under the legislation applicable at the time, extended to material facts within his personal knowledge. It did not require him to conduct engineering or technical investigations to uncover hidden structural defects. The defects would not have been visible to a layperson. They were not within his knowledge. No actionable misrepresentation was established.

The voetstoots clause held

The sale agreement contained a voetstoots (as it stands) clause. To defeat it, the buyers were required to prove two things: that the seller had actual knowledge of the latent defect, and that he deliberately concealed it with the intention to defraud.

Neither was established. The buyers’ own evidence undermined the claim. Both buyers described the seller as a decent, honest person. One stated plainly that the seller did not know about the defects. Quick-fix repairs noted by the experts did not change that conclusion. Repairs may reflect ordinary maintenance. They do not, on their own, establish knowledge of a structural defect or an intention to deceive. Fraud is not lightly inferred.

Getting the damages calculation wrong

Even if the buyers had established liability, their damages claim faced a separate problem. The actio quanti minoris, a claim for a reduction in the purchase price, entitles a buyer to compensation for the property’s reduced value caused by the defect. The reasonable cost to repair may serve as evidence of that reduction, but no more. The buyers simply claimed replacement costs, which was entirely the wrong way of going about it.

In plain terms

Puffery is not a promise – in fact, it’s to be expected in real estate listings. A voetstoots clause is not easily defeated. And the burden of investigating a property before signing rests firmly on the buyer.

Nine court days. Twelve years. Presumably substantial legal costs. Every claim dismissed. Get advice before you sign, not after the deck collapses.

Disclaimer: The information provided herein should not be used or relied on as professional advice. No liability can be accepted for any errors or omissions nor for any loss or damage arising from reliance upon any information herein. Always contact us for specific and detailed advice.

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“I can’t afford to die; I’d lose too much money.” (George Burns, comedian)

At the heart of any estate plan lies your will. Pair it with a file containing all the information and documents that your executor and heirs will need to wind up your estate, and you’ve laid a solid foundation for protecting your loved ones when you’re no longer around to do so.

Hopefully, most of us have already crossed those two essentials off our “to do” list. But there’s a third step which doesn’t always receive the attention it requires: planning for the costs your estate will have to pay, including a number of taxes.

As with all things to do with SARS and tax, there are many detailed requirements and grey areas involved, so what follows is a general guide only. It’s no substitute for specific professional advice.

The big costs you should plan for

• Costs: Central to your estate planning will be understanding just how much each of your heirs will actually receive from your estate after costs, the most significant of which are usually executor’s fees and government taxes.
• Taxes: There are two main taxes to consider: estate duty, and capital gains tax (CGT). In this article, we’ll focus on the CGT aspect for the simple reason that it’s often forgotten about, and even more often misunderstood.

CGT: The ambush tax lurking in the wings

CGT is one of those low-profile taxes that lurks around unobtrusively in the wings, being ignored and forgotten about until it suddenly pops out of the woodwork.

In this case, the “popping out of the woodwork” will happen when you’re no longer around to be ambushed by it. That’s because CGT is triggered by a taxpayer’s death, which is a “deemed disposal” tax event. In other words, your assets are deemed to have been sold at market value on the day you died. And that triggers a tax liability for your estate on the asset’s growth in value since you acquired it – the capital gain.

Before we get into the nitty-gritty of putting figures to that liability, let’s share a smidgen of good news.

The good news: 3 big exclusions, boosted by Budget 2026

Note firstly that no CGT at all is payable on “personal-use assets”, retirement fund benefits and most mainstream life policies.

Secondly, there’s “spousal rollover relief”: liability for CGT on assets left to your spouse is “rolled over” so that it’s payable not by your estate but later on by your spouse (on sale) or by their estate (on death). That, of course, can make a tremendous practical difference in ensuring that your spouse will be okay financially.

Thirdly, the annual exclusion in year of death, the primary residence exclusion and the small business disposal exclusion can all reduce CGT substantially. And as we note below, Budget 2026 has boosted them all. Good news indeed!

1. Annual exclusion in year of death: If you sell assets during your lifetime, your CGT liability is reduced by an annual exclusion of R50,000 (up from R40,000). In the year of your death, this exclusion is boosted to R440,000 (previously R300,000).
2. The primary residence exclusion: This is a big one for property owners in respect of their “primary residence” (the home you ordinarily live in), with the exclusion increased from R2,000,000 to R3,000,000.
3. The small business asset disposal exclusion: If you leave a small business with a market value of up to R15,000,000 (previously R10,000,000), your estate may qualify for a R2,700,000 exclusion (was R1,800,000) on the assets of the business, which are deemed to have been disposed of on your death. Many small businesses will also qualify for wear-and-tear on assets used in the business. Quantifying this requires professional assistance.

How to calculate CGT

Now for the actual CGT calculation, which will give you a rough idea of the final liability so you can plan for it:

1. Include all your assets (except those mentioned above as not being subject to CGT) at their current market value.
2. Deduct the base cost of each asset; that is what you bought the asset for plus allowable costs such as costs of acquisition and the cost of subsequent capital improvements.
3. Calculate the capital gain or loss by subtracting the base cost from the market value.
4. Deduct all exclusions from the capital gain to calculate the net gain.
5. Multiply the net gain by the 40% inclusion rate to give you the taxable capital gain.
6. Finally, apply your marginal tax rate to that taxable capital gain to give you the final CGT liability.

Putting together a comprehensive estate plan, anchored by your will, is essential to ensure that your loved ones are properly catered for after you’re gone. You know who to call if you need any help!

Disclaimer: The information provided herein should not be used or relied on as professional advice. No liability can be accepted for any errors or omissions nor for any loss or damage arising from reliance upon any information herein. Always contact us for specific and detailed advice.

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“A creature with a big enough head to make a contract should have the sense to make one it can keep.” (Barbara Kingsolver)

A R1.725 million deposit. A bank guarantee that never arrived. A property that ultimately sold for significantly less than the original price. What happens to the deposit money?

A sale that fell apart

The seller agreed to sell an agricultural property in Kyalami for R17.25 million. The purchaser paid a deposit of R1.725 million into the estate agent’s trust account. The balance of the purchase price was to be secured by a bank guarantee on request.

The seller called for the guarantee and gave 14 days to comply. When it was not provided, a further notice gave five business days to remedy the breach. The guarantee was still not furnished. The seller cancelled the agreement and claimed the full deposit.

The purchaser attempted to recover it, but the claim failed.

Rouwkoop or penalty clause?

A true rouwkoop clause – from the Dutch for “regret-purchase” – allows a party to withdraw from a sale by paying a fixed amount. It is an agreed exit mechanism, not a consequence of breach. A forfeiture clause operates differently. It is triggered by breach and is subject to the Conventional Penalties Act. The clause in this case fell into the latter category. The purchaser’s only remaining recourse was section 3 of the Act, which allows a court to reduce a penalty if it is out of proportion to the prejudice suffered.

Why the deadline mattered

The purchaser argued that the word “timeously” meant within a reasonable time, not strictly within the five-day notice period. The court rejected that argument.

Read in context, the agreement created a clear notice-and-remedy mechanism. The five-day period was the operative timeframe. “Timeously” did not introduce flexibility. It referred back to the period expressly stipulated in the contract.

Once the guarantee was not provided within that period, the seller’s right to cancel arose. What the purchaser might have done after the deadline was irrelevant.

Can the court step in?

The purchaser invoked section 3 of the Conventional Penalties Act. That argument did not succeed.

The court looked beyond the arithmetic. It considered the broader consequences of the failed transaction, including the collapse of an onward purchase, the loss of a prior offer, bridging finance, and extended holding costs.

On that evidence, the seller’s prejudice was substantial. The forfeited deposit bore a reasonable relationship to that prejudice. There was no basis for interference.

The real lesson

Deadlines in property transactions are not flexible unless the agreement says so. A deposit is not a placeholder and sellers don’t have to play nice. The bottom line? Get advice before you sign.

Disclaimer: The information provided herein should not be used or relied on as professional advice. No liability can be accepted for any errors or omissions nor for any loss or damage arising from reliance upon any information herein. Always contact us for specific and detailed advice.

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“Justice cannot be for one side alone, but must be for both.” (Eleanor Roosevelt)

Under the antenuptial contract alone, she would have had no claim on his estate. The court found otherwise. A woman who spent three decades running a home, raising her husband’s children, supporting his career, and making financial contributions to joint expenses received 40% of his estate. The parties were married out of community of property without the accrual system. The antenuptial contract said their estates were separate. Contribution told a different story.

What changed and why it matters

Until recently, redistribution orders under section 7(3) of the Divorce Act were only available to couples married before 1 November 1984. Couples who married after that date and excluded the accrual system in their antenuptial contract had no access to this remedy.

The Constitutional Court changed that, declaring the limitation constitutionally invalid. It found the limitation to be unconstitutional, constituting unfair discrimination that disproportionately affected women, who more often sacrifice financial independence for the benefit of the marriage. The redistribution remedy is now available to couples married out of community of property without accrual, regardless of when they married.

What the law requires

A redistribution order is not automatic. The court must be satisfied that the claimant contributed directly or indirectly to the maintenance or increase of the other spouse’s estate during the marriage. The court then considers the means and obligations of each party, any donations made during the marriage, and any other relevant circumstances, before determining what transfer is just and equitable.

Ordinary spousal duties can be enough. A claimant does not need to show contributions beyond what a spouse would ordinarily do. Managing a household, caring for children, supporting a partner’s pursuits: all of these count. The remedy is nonetheless discretionary. Each case turns on its own facts and the burden of proof rests on the party seeking redistribution.

What the court found

The parties had been together for thirty years, six of them as cohabitees before their marriage in 1999. The wife worked in her husband’s legal practice, cared for his children from a previous marriage, managed both their homes, and made direct financial contributions to municipal accounts for two properties. She received modest remuneration, had no savings, no pension, and no formal qualifications beyond standard eight.

The husband, by contrast, built a successful legal practice, invested in several businesses, accumulated properties, gold coins, artworks, and a family trust. He retired comfortably. She left the marriage at 58 with jewellery worth R45 800 and a broken-down vehicle.

The court accepted that the pre-marital cohabitation period was a relevant supporting factor in the redistribution assessment. Where parties live together as husband and wife and pool their resources, that period can constitute a universal partnership, and here it extended the effective duration of their shared life to thirty years rather than twenty-three.

The court also noted that the husband had not made full disclosure of assets held through the family trust, a factor that informed the court’s overall assessment of his estate. The clean break principle was applied. Rather than granting permanent maintenance, the court ordered redistribution of 40% of the husband’s net estate, together with twelve months of rehabilitative maintenance at R20 000 per month.

What this means in practice

An antenuptial contract excluding accrual is not a guarantee that estates will remain separate at divorce. Where one spouse has contributed, directly or indirectly, to the growth of the other’s estate, a court has the power to order a transfer of assets, notwithstanding the contract.

Generally speaking, the longer the marriage lasts and the greater the disparity between estates, the more likely the Court is to order a transfer of assets. But the outcome is never certain. Courts assess these cases on their individual facts.

Got any questions about your ANC? Ask us.

Disclaimer: The information provided herein should not be used or relied on as professional advice. No liability can be accepted for any errors or omissions nor for any loss or damage arising from reliance upon any information herein. Always contact us for specific and detailed advice.

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“Good rules make good neighbours.” (Old proverb, updated)

The many benefits of living in a residential complex come, naturally enough, with obligations as well as rights.

With its innate potential for conflict between competing rights, community living requires a fine balancing act between the individual rights of owners and residents, and the rights of the community as a whole.

Good rules make good neighbours

Which is of course where a complex’s rules and regulations come into play. Rules provide a structured framework to regulate issues of common concern. Management rules concentrate on administrative and financial issues, while conduct rules (which we’ll focus on in this article) address issues such as noise, pets, parking, use of common property and so on. They are essential not only for protecting everyone’s individual and communal rights, but also to minimise disputes, ensure long-term sustainability and maintain property values.

A well-managed complex benefits everyone – residents, investors, landlords etc.

The sight-impaired owner and his washing machine

Of course, conduct rules are meaningless without enforcement, and that exposes everyone concerned to another balancing act: consistent enforcement versus over-rigid and unconstitutional enforcement.

A recent Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) decision highlighted this in the case of a complex with a communal washing area.

Before buying his unit in a complex in Gauteng, a visually-impaired man was assured by the estate agent – incorrectly as it turned out – that he would be entitled to modify the washing area directly outside his unit. He duly, without body corporate authority, moved his washing machine into the area and installed piping and a tap, with a security gate and plastic roof sheeting to protect it from the elements. All this, he said, was necessary both to ensure his safety (he cited the danger of slipping in water leaks which he wouldn’t be able to see) and security for his washing machine and clothes.

The body corporate was having none of that and removed the gate and plastic sheeting, citing its conduct rules which prohibit any owner from making alterations to the common washing area. It refused his request for an exemption from the rules on account of his visual impairment, a mediation attempt failed, and eventually his appeal against a CSOS (Community Schemes Ombud Service) ruling found its way to the SCA.

What came out in the wash

The end result? The body corporate is ordered to allow the owner exclusive use of a portion of the common washing area for his washing machine, plus he can install a protective cover over it at his own expense. He must maintain both in good repair, cannot damage the common area wall, has to pay a contribution levy, and must make good all changes when he leaves. 

The Court’s reasoning gives us a clear roadmap to our rights, both as bodies corporate and HOAs trying to enforce rules and regulations, and as owners feeling prejudiced by unjustifiably rigid enforcement of them:

• The duty to reasonably accommodate persons with disabilities: Our Constitution prohibits unfair discrimination and enshrines a right to dignity and equality as per the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act (PEPUDA) which prohibits any failure to take steps to reasonably accommodate persons with disabilities.
• When rigid enforcement of rules isn’t justified: The body corporate’s refusal to accommodate the owner in this case didn’t take into account that his modifications were necessary for safety reasons, they were proportionate, tailored for his disability, and confined to what he considered essential to prevent harm to himself. They caused no undue inconvenience or hardship to other members of the scheme, nor any expense for the body corporate. Its rigid attitude in enforcing its conduct rules was not justified, and its failure to give him its conduct rules electronically or in Braille was unjust.
• What does “reasonable accommodation” entail? Perhaps the most critical of the Court’s findings is this: “To achieve the objective of equality, I find that reasonable accommodation in a case like this may include allowing structural modifications, granting exclusive rights or exempting disabled residents from burdensome rules.”
• The “minimum hardship to members” principle: At the same time, a body corporate must, in establishing what is and isn’t reasonable in the circumstances, “espouse the principle of minimum hardship to its members”. Witness the strict limits imposed by the Court in this case on the unit owner’s rights of usage.

Thin end of the wedge or just a balancing act?

There may be some concern amongst bodies corporate and HOAs that this is the “thin end of the wedge” when it comes to effective enforcement of rules and regulations. When faced with individual requests which go against the rules and regulations, where should bodies corporate and HOAs draw the line?

Ultimately, the safest course is probably to keep on performing that delicate balancing act we mentioned above, plotting a careful course between individual and communal rights fairly, impartially and reasonably. Common sense isn’t as common as it should be.

Whether you’re an owner, body corporate or HOA, we’re here to help you plot that course!

Disclaimer: The information provided herein should not be used or relied on as professional advice. No liability can be accepted for any errors or omissions nor for any loss or damage arising from reliance upon any information herein. Always contact us for specific and detailed advice.

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“To avoid criticism, do nothing, say nothing, be nothing.” (Elbert Hubbard)

An unpleasant boss. A strained working relationship. A manager whose style leaves much to be desired. Sound familiar? For many employees, the line between a miserable workplace and an unlawful one is frustratingly blurry. A 2023 Labour Court judgment helps draw that line more clearly. And the verdict may surprise some employees who’ve been banking on a harassment claim.

A senior official takes her employer to court

A Deputy Director-General at the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development referred a claim of unfair discrimination to the Labour Court. She alleged that she had been harassed on arbitrary grounds (as opposed to listed grounds like “race” or “gender”) in contravention of the Employment Equity Act (EEA).

Her complaints were wide-ranging: inadequate administrative support and resources, the removal of some of her work functions and reportees, what she viewed as selective disciplinary sanctions, a precautionary transfer she experienced as a demotion, being denied international travel and refused leave requests, plus a failure by the Department to consider her grievances.

The Court dismissed her claim in full.

What does “harassment” actually mean in law?

The Court was at pains to distinguish between exercising ordinary managerial authority and conduct that crosses into unlawful harassment. The two are easily confused, and employees sometimes interpret unwelcome management decisions as harassment simply because the consequences are unpleasant.

For conduct to constitute harassment under the EEA, it must meet an objective test. It must:

• Impair the employee’s dignity. Feeling sidelined or unhappy is not enough. The conduct must cause demonstrable harm to dignity.
• Create a hostile or intimidating work environment. Tension and friction are regrettably common in workplaces. The bar is higher than mere discomfort.
• Be linked to a prohibited or arbitrary ground. This is the element that catches many claimants off guard. An “arbitrary ground” is an unlisted personal characteristic, but it must be inherent to the person, form the basis for the ill-treatment, and result in substantial harm comparable to listed grounds like race or gender. Generalised management decisions, however unwelcome, do not qualify.

Crucially, the test is objective, not subjective. What matters is not solely how the employee experienced the conduct, but how a reasonable person would assess it in context.

Where the DDG’s case fell short

The Court found that, objectively assessed, her complaints amounted to the unpleasant consequences of management decisions rather than harassment in the legal sense. Significantly, she was unable to explain why the treatment she experienced amounted to unfair discrimination. A bald allegation is not sufficient. Employees must clearly establish the link between the conduct and a dignity-impairing ground.

What employers and employees should take from this

Employers may take some comfort here. Issuing instructions, reallocating duties, managing performance, declining travel requests, and initiating investigations are ordinary management functions. Provided those decisions are rational, grounded in legitimate operational reasons, consistently applied, and properly documented, they will not automatically expose employers to harassment claims.

That said, the Court was clear that managerial discretion has its limits. Decisions must be fair, transparent, and free from personalisation or arbitrary whim. When they are not, they may give rise to legal challenge.

Employees should be aware that the EEA is not a catch-all for general workplace dissatisfaction. If your complaint relates to a transfer, disciplinary steps, or benefits, the proper route is likely the Labour Relations Act’s unfair labour practice framework, not an EEA harassment claim.

The distinction between a difficult manager and a workplace bully matters enormously, both legally and practically. If you are uncertain which side of the line your situation falls on, come and talk to us.

Disclaimer: The information provided herein should not be used or relied on as professional advice. No liability can be accepted for any errors or omissions nor for any loss or damage arising from reliance upon any information herein. Always contact us for specific and detailed advice.

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“The big print giveth and the fine print taketh away.” (Tom Waits)

You have almost certainly signed a disclaimer at some point. A waiver before a trail run, an indemnity form before a bungee jump, a clause buried in a brochure. Businesses rely on these documents to limit their exposure when things go wrong. A 2026 Supreme Court of Appeal judgment is a sharp reminder that a disclaimer is only as good as the process behind it, and that courts will not lightly allow a company to escape liability on the strength of fine print that was never properly agreed to.

A birthday surprise that ended in serious injury

An Australian tourist was travelling in a converted safari truck in Botswana as part of a Southern African tour arranged by a safari business. The trip had been booked by her life partner as a birthday surprise, without her knowledge. While the truck was moving, she stood up to access her locker, which the tour operator actively promoted as accessible while the vehicle was in motion. She lost her balance and lurched against a window which fell out of its frame. She fell through the opening onto the tar road and sustained serious injuries.

When she sued for damages, the company relied on two disclaimers. The courts were not persuaded.

When does a disclaimer actually bind you?

The party relying on a disclaimer bears the onus of proving that a binding agreement was concluded. That requires more than paperwork. Our law requires the following:

• Personal consent. A disclaimer binds a person only if they have personally agreed to it, or if someone signing on their behalf had proper authority to do so. A life partner, family member, or friend cannot sign away your legal rights without your knowledge and express authorisation.
• Adequate notice. The disclaimer must be displayed with sufficient prominence to reasonably come to the attention of the person against whom it is enforced. Burying a liability exclusion under an “Insurance” heading does not meet that standard.
• Specific and unambiguous wording. Disclaimers are interpreted restrictively. General wording will not exclude liability for negligence unless it does so clearly and unequivocally. Ambiguity counts against the party that drafted the clause.
• Consumer Protection Act compliance. Where serious injury or death is a risk, sections 49 and 58 of the CPA require that the risk be specifically drawn to the consumer’s attention in plain language and in a conspicuous manner before the activity commences.

Two disclaimers, two failures

Both disclaimers relied on by the business failed these requirements. The first, buried in a brochure under an insurance heading, was too general to clearly exclude liability for the negligence alleged and had not been adequately brought to the victim’s attention. The second was an indemnity form signed by her partner without her knowledge. The SCA found no credible evidence that she was even aware of its existence. The business had only itself to blame. It had failed to ensure that each participant had personally concluded a binding indemnity.

The Court further indicated that having actively promoted the conduct that caused the injury, any disclaimer purporting to exclude liability for it would likely have been contrary to public policy and thus unenforceable.

What this means for businesses and consumers

Businesses operating in high-risk environments cannot afford to treat indemnity documentation as a formality. A disclaimer is not a substitute for safe practices and proper risk management. Consent cannot be assumed, and general wording will not suffice.

For consumers, your right to bodily safety is not easily signed away, especially by someone else on your behalf.

The lesson is straightforward. A disclaimer must be clearly communicated, properly understood and formally agreed to. It will not protect a business where consent is absent, notice is inadequate, or the wording does not clearly cover the risk.

If your indemnity documentation needs reviewing, or you are unsure of your rights as a consumer, ask us.

Disclaimer: The information provided herein should not be used or relied on as professional advice. No liability can be accepted for any errors or omissions nor for any loss or damage arising from reliance upon any information herein. Always contact us for specific and detailed advice.

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“One of the greatest disservices you can do a man is to lend him money that he can’t pay back.” (Jesse H. Jones, entrepreneur)

A recent High Court decision provides yet another cautionary tale for lenders. The stakes are high: get this wrong, and you could lose everything.

Two big risks for lenders

Before you lend, be aware of two major risks that you need to manage. Both are imposed by the National Credit Act (NCA):

1. Not registering as a credit provider: If you lend money without registering when you were required to do so, your agreement will be invalid and unenforceable. You will lose everything unless you can convince a court to make a “just and equitable” order allowing you at least a partial recovery. This is by no means guaranteed, so a risk not worth taking.

   As a general guideline, if your loan is made at “arm’s length” you will probably have to register. In contrast, loans not made at arm’s length – such as informal loans between family and friends, or between related companies in a group – may be excluded. But the rules are complex and our courts have had to wrestle with several borderline cases over the definition of “arm’s length”. There is no substitute for advice specific to your situation.

   Note that even a single qualifying loan, of any size, can trigger the requirement. The thresholds that previously limited it to commercial lenders and to larger loans fell away in 2014 and 2016 respectively.

2. Reckless lending: Let’s turn now to the second risk, which applies whether you are properly registered as a credit provider or not. We’ll illustrate it with a recent High Court decision in which a family trust’s lending was held to be reckless and therefore irrecoverable.

A family trust lends R430k to a heavily indebted couple

A SAPS employee and her husband, heavily indebted to a range of creditors, approached a debt consolidation business for help in 2012.

Having carried out its version of the credit assessment required by the NCA, the debt consolidator organised a lifeline for the couple in the form of a R430,000 loan from an investor (a family trust) to pay off their debts. The loan was secured primarily by a bond over the couple’s house in Kraaifontein. A secondary security in the form of a sale agreement by the couple to the trust was to be held in reserve and activated only in need. The idea was that, after a short period of financial rehabilitation, the borrowers would refinance the loan through a bank, but that never happened.

When the borrowers defaulted on their repayments, the trust sued for R430,000 plus interest (a lot of money at 17.1% p.a. for 10 years), and an order allowing it to sell the couple’s bonded house to satisfy the debt.

The Court declared the credit agreement “reckless credit” and set it aside. The trust must now write off the balance of its loan and interest, cancel its bond over the couple’s house, and pay all the legal costs. Its only consolation is that the Court, in exercising its discretion to structure a just and equitable solution between the parties, allowed the trust to keep the R251,325 already paid to it.

What went wrong?

Why did the lender lose so badly? In a nutshell, the affordability assessment performed by the debt consolidator was flawed. Instead of asking whether the couple could afford this loan based on their existing financial means (as required by the NCA), the assessment relied on “a risky potential of future funding”, i.e., the speculative prospect of a mainstream bank granting a further loan in the future. The borrowers had always been over-indebted, this new loan made their situation even worse, and therefore the lending was reckless.

Lenders: How to avoid a “reckless lending” declaration

NCA regulations in force since 2015 set out in detail the various technical criteria and formulae to be used in assessments. This is just an overview of what you need to cover:

• Perform a proper credit assessment: This is make-or-break. It is a specific and fundamental requirement of the NCA that you carry out a proper assessment before granting credit, and you must be able to prove that you did so with documentary backup if challenged.
• Confirm affordability: Assess income, expenses, and existing debt, verifying everything with proper salary slips, bank statements, etc. As we saw in the case above, affordability must be assessed on the borrower’s current “financial means, prospects and obligations”, not future hopes or prospects. You must establish the borrower’s “discretionary income” by subtracting from total income all monthly deductions, living expenses and the like, with reference to a table of “norms” set out in the regulations.
• Check repayment history: You must take into account the borrower’s debt repayment history under other credit agreements.
• Explain everything fully to the borrower: Make sure the borrower fully understands the structure of the loan, the total costs, obligations, and risks. Use plain, non-technical language to avoid any claims of confusion or deception.
• Avoid over-indebtedness: You must be able to show that the repayment plan is realistic and affordable to avoid a finding of over-indebtedness.

Disclaimer: The information provided herein should not be used or relied on as professional advice. No liability can be accepted for any errors or omissions nor for any loss or damage arising from reliance upon any information herein. Always contact us for specific and detailed advice.

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“It is a comfortable feeling to know that you stand on your own ground. Land is about the only thing that can’t fly away.” (English novelist Anthony Trollope)

With interest and home loan rates at their lowest since 2022, it’s no surprise that South Africa’s property market confidence level at the end of 2025 was sitting at a record high of 87%. That will have been boosted by the country’s positive economic outlook following Budget 2026, and by Budget 2026’s 50% increase in the primary residence exclusion (which should stimulate sales by reducing the CGT payable by sellers).

If you are a buyer about to put in an offer on a house, remember to budget for the various costs you’ll face over and above the purchase price. In all the excitement of your purchase (particularly if it’s your first house!) it’s easy to underbudget. But you really don’t want to risk any unpleasant financial surprises. If you do breach a term of the sale agreement by not paying something on time, you could even face cancellation of the sale and a damages claim.

Only with a proper budget and cash flow forecast can you be confident both that you really can afford to offer for the house you’ve fallen in love with, and that you’ll be able to pay everything you need to, when you need to.

Have a look at the list we’ve put together below and use it to prepare your own detailed cash flow forecast. Ignore anything that doesn’t apply to you and bear in mind that every buyer’s situation will be unique, so this is no more than a generalised checklist.

Costs payable before transfer

• The deposit: Most sale agreements – often titled as an “Offer to Purchase” (OTP) until it’s accepted by the seller – require you to pay a deposit, usually 5% or 10% of the purchase price.
• Bond/home loan initiation fee: This fee normally incorporates a valuation fee and is added to your loan, but check with whichever bank you use.
• Homeowner’s insurance policy and life cover policy (if required by the bank): Be sure to provide for payment of the first premiums before bond registration.
• Balance of the purchase price: If the deposit you paid and the bond you took out don’t cover the full price, you’ll need to pay the balance before transfer.
• Transfer duty: Unless VAT applies to the sale, transfer duty is payable. This is a government tax payable via SARS before transfer. It applies to all property sales over R1,210,000, on a sliding scale linked to the sale price. This can be a substantial cost!
• Transfer fees: The transferring attorney (conveyancer) charges fees based on a sliding scale linked to the sale price. Added to the account will be charges for FICA verification, deeds searches, postages and petties, other disbursements and the like.
• Bond registration fees: If you take out a bond, the bank appoints an attorney to register it, with the fees calculated on the size of the loan and including the attorney’s fees, FICA charges and a prescribed Deeds Office registration fee.
• Deeds Office fees: These are government charges for both transfer and bond registration.
• Rates clearance: Your local municipality will require advance pro-rata payment of municipal rates before it issues the necessary clearance certificate.
• Levy clearance: Similarly, if you are buying into a complex, the sectional title’s body corporate or Homeowners’ Association (HOA) will require pro-rata levy payments before issuing a clearance certificate.
• Occupational interest (if applicable): If you take occupation before transfer, you need to budget for whatever occupational interest is provided for in the sale agreement.
• Utility deposits: If required by your local municipality when opening up water and electricity accounts.
• Moving costs: Don’t overlook these when budgeting!

Some of these costs are easily overlooked, but they can add up alarmingly. So, plan for them all before you put in your offer to purchase.

Ongoing monthly costs after transfer

Include bond instalments, municipal rates and taxes, levy payments (if you buy in a sectional title or HOA), utility charges, insurance premiums for the property and the contents, and so on.

One-off costs after transfer

If you plan to do alterations or repairs, redecoration, garden revamps, furniture replacement or anything similar, add these costs to your budgeting so you don’t suddenly run out of money and have to postpone them. For long-term planning, set aside a budget for ongoing home maintenance.

As always, we are here to assist, so let us know if you have any questions, need any further information, or would like help in creating a cash-flow projection specific to your purchase.

Disclaimer: The information provided herein should not be used or relied on as professional advice. No liability can be accepted for any errors or omissions nor for any loss or damage arising from reliance upon any information herein. Always contact us for specific and detailed advice.

© LawDotNews

“Knowledge is power.” (Sir Francis Bacon)

Being a company director carries not only rewards but also risks that you need to manage carefully.

In particular, you are held by the Companies Act to a high standard of conduct. Breaching any of your many duties and responsibilities can have significant negative consequences. Among these is being declared a “delinquent director”. That’s no small thing…

It’s a serious long term career risk

Serious categories of misconduct expose directors to being declared delinquent and thus disqualified from holding any directorship or senior management position for a period ranging from 7 years to a lifetime.

A wide range of less serious categories of misconduct can lead to “probation” orders, with possible consequences including disqualification for up to 5 years, supervision by a mentor, remedial education, community service, and payment of compensation.

The other side of the coin, of course, is that the delinquency risk isn’t just a warning to directors. It also gives victims of director misconduct a powerful remedy.

Let’s illustrate in the context of two recent cases.

Seven years in the wilderness (and a R78m damages bill) for a delinquent MD

Two groups of granite producing companies, one responsible for quarrying and the other for production and export, operated inter-dependently for decades. All went well until the Managing Director of the quarrying group of companies placed them into business rescue. Unsurprisingly, this had a devastating effect on both groups, with mining rights in jeopardy, credit lines and bank facilities lost, production levels affected, discussions with SARS over penalties terminated, and millions wasted both in the business rescue process and in remedying the aftermath.

The companies in the surviving group of companies sued the MD of the quarrying group with allegations that those companies should not have been placed into business rescue at all, and for various other acts of mismanagement and misconduct.

The MD’s defences to these claims found no favour with the Court, which declared him delinquent and ordered him to pay R78m in damages. He had, the Court held, unnecessarily placed companies into business rescue without engaging shareholders and despite available shareholder support and the absence of true financial distress. He had acted with gross negligence, caused substantial financial damage, breached his fiduciary duties (i.e. used his powers improperly and not in the best interests of the companies), and neglected his supervisory duties relating to quarry operations.

Another director, another disqualification

Now let’s move to a struggle between two shareholder factions for control of an investment company with energy sector interests. Exasperated, one faction went to the High Court to challenge the validity of a board resolution and share issue which affected their control of the company. There was substantial value at stake here, possibly (reading between the lines of the judgment) many millions of US dollars.

The dispute eventually found its way to the SCA (Supreme Court of Appeal), where, on application by the opposing shareholder faction, a director (and sometime Executive Chairperson) of the investment company was declared delinquent for seven years.

He had, found the Court, acted with gross negligence, wilful misconduct and breach of trust in performing his functions. Here’s one example among many: even after his removal as Chairperson, he purported to call a shareholder meeting “By order of the Chairman.” That alone, said the Court, was “a blithe disrespect for corporate governance and [a breach of] his fiduciary duty as a director.”

If you’re a director, here’s how to manage your risk

Your best defence against hostile stakeholders will always be to remain fully aware of all your many fiduciary duties, and to scrupulously comply with them. Knowledge is power!

Act early to address any financial issues that could lead to accusations of reckless trading or of causing financial harm to the company. Ensure that proper financial and operational controls and procedures are in place. At all times act strictly in the best interests of your company with transparency and good faith, proactively exercise proper oversight of all operations, and – perhaps most importantly – ask us for advice if in any doubt!

Disclaimer: The information provided herein should not be used or relied on as professional advice. No liability can be accepted for any errors or omissions nor for any loss or damage arising from reliance upon any information herein. Always contact us for specific and detailed advice.

© LawDotNews